When Oscar loses his tail the resulting creature is certainly a dog

2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus per dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is per dog? We saw above that one possible response esatto Chrysippus’ paradox was esatto claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not a dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is a dog, then, given the standard account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Sopra fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is a proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus per hair – which is just as much per dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and per fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply sicuro avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar macchia. But the maximality principle may seem sicuro be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark con unison? If a thing is a dog, shouldn’t it be trapu of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested per reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (in various different ways) from one another and Oscar by verso hair, as dogs, and con fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is verso Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still per place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later esatto become definitely Dalmatians; some in per day, some sopra a second, or verso split second. It seems arbitrary preciso proclaim a Dalmatian part that is a split second away from becoming definitely verso Dalmatian, per Dalmatian, while denying that one verso day away is verso Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems onesto favor one of the latter type according preciso which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Durante any case, the standard account of identity seems unable on its own preciso handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus verso hair is verso dog – and a Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is per multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark mediante unison per niente more loudly than Oscar barks chiazza.

2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases a piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into verso statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into verso ball and fashions ardent a new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes a part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using per new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by a new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Per natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical sicuro \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical onesto \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical to \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical onesto) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical to \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By verso similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical onesto both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the norma account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants in quantified modal logic are onesto be handled exactly as they are con first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced preciso affirm that distinct physical objects di nuovo time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The standard account is thus precedentemente facie incompatible with the natural ispirazione that constitution is identity.